Abstract. This study develops a model for wildlife migrating seasonally between a conservation area and a neighbouring area. When being outside the conservation area, harvesting takes place by a group of small-scale farmers. The local people have two motives for harvesting; to get rid of "problem" animals as roaming wildlife destroys crops and agricultural products, and hunting for meat and trophies. Depending on the specification of the property rights, the harvesting is legal or illegal. It is demonstrated that it is far from clear which of the two property rights regimes that gives the highest wildlife abundance. Hence, contrary to what is argued for in the literature, handing the property rights over to the local people means not automatically more wildlife and a more "sustainable" resource utilization. The reason lies in the nuisance motive for harvesting. The exploitation under the two different property rights regimes are illustrated by numerical calculations with data that fits reasonable well with the exploitation of the wildebeest population in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem.
Introduction
For a long time it has been recognised that institutions play an important role in natural resource management, and that the specification and function of property rights to a large extent determine whether resources can be utilized in a sustainable way. These dimensions will be at the focus in the present study when analysing the management and exploitation of wildlife in a sub-Saharan Africa context with example from the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. When considering natural resources in the form of wildlife in this region, as in other regions in the sub-Saharan Africa, central issues are the behaviour of the local people living close to the wildlife, and the interaction between the local people, the wildlife and the agency managing and having the legal property rights of the wildlife. Often this interaction represents conflicting interests; both the legal owner of the wildlife (usually the State, or large private landowners) and the rural people claim their rights to reap the benefits of the huge amount of wildlife resources. In addition, the costs of having abundant wildlife populations differ between them. These conflicts, rooted in the prevailing property structure and its functioning, have serious implications for the resource exploitation and, thus, on the management of the wildlife in general (Marks 1984; Kiss 1990; Swanson and Barbier 1992; Naughton-Treves and Sanderson 1995; Sinclair and Arcese 1995; Skonhoft and Solstad 1998; Bulte and van Kooten 1999) .
The common perception in the literature is that local communities will support wildlife conservation and reduce the wildlife offtake if they are ensured a sufficient share of the benefits from wildlife (see Kiss 1990; Swanson and Barbier 1992; Mangel et al. 1996) . Under what conditions a community based management system results in a higher wildlife abundance and more conservation than the polar scheme where the local people have no legal rights to wildlife exploitation, is analysed in the present paper. The starting point is that we have a protected area, a national park or a conservation area of fixed size, with no harvesting of the wildlife. The protected area is the basic living area of the species, but the animals roam freely in and out of the park. When being outside, the game destroys the crops of the farmers living in the vicinity of the park and hence, the wildlife represents a nuisance for the local people. The park agency has the property rights of the wildlife within as well as outside the protected area, but illegal harvesting takes place outside as the property rights is not effectively protected here. This is the first regime where the local people have no property rights.
1 In the next step, the property rights are handed over to the local people and hence, the exploitation of the wildlife outside the protected area takes place in a legal manner.
2 The different degree of wildlife utilization is compared under these two regimes, and contrary to what is argued for in the literature the first property rights scheme may result in the highest wildlife abundance. Analysing the driving forces behind such an outcome is the main contribution of this paper.
The hunting activity and the utilization of the wildlife under these two regimes are exemplified by the migration of wildebeest in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. The migration pattern here, which is seasonal and related to rainfall and food supply, is also used as a motivation for the ecological part of the model. Parts of the year the migratory wildebeest population is staying within the huge Serengeti national park and it is assumed that no human extraction takes place here.
3 However, when being outside there is hunting. The conceptual framework for analysing the exploitation of a terrestrial animal population when there is migration, and hunting is a seasonal activity, is another contribution of the paper.
To simplify the following analysis we consider only two areas; the protected area and the whole boundary region collapsed into one boundary area. The protected area is the basic living area of the wildlife and is owned and managed by the State. No human extraction is allowed here, and hence, non-consumptive benefit (tourism, existence value, etc.) is the only benefit of this area. However, the
